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Twofileness. A Functionalist Approach to Fictional Characters and Mental Files
This paper considers two issues raised by the claim that fictional characters are abstract artifacts. In
making  this  claim,  Amie  Thomasson  (1999)  has  characterized  abstract  artifacts  as  products  of
human creativity that, unlike concrete artifacts, lack a spatial location but have a beginning and
possibly an end in time. If one endorses this view there are two basic questions that should be
addressed. First, given that artifacts normally have functions, what is the function of a fictional
character?  Second,  given  that,  in  experiencing  works  of  fictions,  we  usually  treat  fictional
characters as concrete individuals, how can such a phenomenology fit with an ontology according
to which fictional characters are abstract artifacts?
I will indirectly address the second issue by directly addressing the first one. 
In §§ 1-2, I will claim that the function of fictional characters is the generation of mental files
of a special kind. I will argue that our experience of fictional characters as concrete individuals
depends  on  the  “irregular”  mental  files  that  are  generated  by  fictional  characters  as  abstract
artifacts.  Furthermore,  I  will  show  that  appreciators  of  works  of  fiction  can  open  not  only
“irregular” files about fictional individuals but also “regular” files about the corresponding abstract
artifacts. This is the phenomenon that I will call ‘twofileness’. 
In § 3, I will address the objection according to which mental files about fictional individuals
are not generated by fictional characters themselves, understood as abstract artifacts, but simply by
works  of  fiction.  I  will  show  that  one  can  conceive  of  fictional  characters  as  the  functional
components of a work of fiction that generate such mental files. From this perspective, fictional
characters contribute to the functioning of a work of fiction much as the respiratory system or the
digestive system contribute to the life of an animal. I will argue that this is a good reason to endorse
artifactualism about fictional characters. I will call this ‘the argument from mental files’. 
In  §  4  I  will  show that  this  argument  is  compatible  with  both  an  “austere”  artifactualism
according to which fictional characters are nothing but functional components of works of fiction
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and a “robust” artifactualism according to which fictional characters are self-standing entities that
are embodied in works of fiction. Although the argument from mental files helps us to highlight the
distinction between these two kinds of artifactualism, it does not allow us to choose between them.
It remains neutral on this point.
In § 5, I will clarify the twofileness phenomenon by figuring out the relationship between the
two kinds of mental files that are at play in our engagement with fiction, namely mental files about
concrete individuals in the fictional world and mental files about abstract artifacts in the actual
world. In so doing, I will show that twofileness can play a role not only in our engagement with
fiction but also in our thinking or speaking of fictional  characters from the outside of such an
engagement.
In § 6, I will address another objection to the argument from mental files. According to this
argument, one should conclude that historical figures, in turn, exist not only as concrete individuals
but also as abstract artifacts. This is clearly absurd and therefore – so the objection runs – the
argument should be wrong. I will reply by biting the bullet, that is, by showing that there is no
absurdity in treating historical characters as those functional components of works of history that
allow us to deploy mental files about the corresponding historical individuals. Yet, there is a crucial
difference between fiction and non-fiction in this respect; in the case of historical individuals, one
mental file is sufficient in order to store all the information we can acquire about them whereas, in
the case of fictional individuals, two files are needed. In this sense, the notion of twofileness can
help us to shed some light on the distinction between fiction and non-fiction.
In § 7,  I  will  consider  one last  objection to  my functionalist  approach according to which
fictional characters are abstract artifacts whose function consists in generating mental files in the
minds  of  appreciators  of  works  of  fiction.  According  to  this  objection,  fictional  characters,  as
abstract artifacts, cannot originate causal chains that end up in the generation of mental files in the
minds  of  appreciators.  I  will  reply to  this  objection by focusing  on the process  of  creation  of
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fictional characters. I will argue that the abstract objects created by such a process can originate
causal chains that pass through concrete tokens and end up in the minds of appreciators.
Finally, in § 8, I will draw my conclusions.
1.  Drawing  on  the  seminal  works  of  Paul  Grice  (1969)  and  Peter  Strawson  (1974),  François
Recanati (2012) defines a mental file as a vehicle of singular thought whose function is to store
information acquired  by  a  subject  in  virtue  of  some  “epistemically  rewarding”  relation  to  a
particular individual. In short, a mental file is a pair <information about the individual, relation to
the  individual>.  The  relation  is  “epistemically  rewarding”  because  it  allows  us  to  acquire
information about the individual. 
Although a mental file allows us to store information about that individual, the file’s reference
is determined by the relation, not by the information. The referent is the individual the file is related
to,  independently  of  whether  this  individual  satisfies  all  the  information  stored  in  the  file.  In
Recanati’s terms, “The reference of a file is determined relationally,  not satisfactionally” (2012,
viii).
However, there can be mental files that are not related to any individual. Recanati calls them
“irregular files”. He points out that “mental files are governed by an acquaintance norm” (2013,
208), which allows us to distinguish between regular and irregular files. A regular file is related to
its object by an acquaintance relation, which is based on some suitable causal link or chain, viz.
perception or testimony. Yet, there can be also  irregular files lacking acquaintance. We normally
deploy regular files, but we are also capable of deploying irregular files. In this sense, “one can
think a singular thought in the absence of acquaintance” (Recanati 2012, 165). From the subject’s
perspective,  regular and irregular files behave roughly in the same way.  They both give us the
impression of being related to particular individuals in spite of the fact that the regular file really
has an acquaintance relation to its object whereas the irregular file lacks it. 
4
Within the category of irregular files, Recanati distinguishes two opposite cases. On the one
hand,  files  that  are  created  by  a  subject  who  attempts  to  satisfy  the  acquaintance  norm  by
presupposing or expecting an acquaintance relation to an object, either correctly (as in the case of
Neptune, an actual planet rightly predicted by Le Verrier) or incorrectly (as in the case of Vulcan, a
nonexistent planet wrongly predicted by the same scientist). On the other hand, files that are created
by a subject in spite of her awareness of the lack on an acquaintance relation. In the latter case, the
subject does not attempt to satisfy the acquaintance norm and therefore she cannot be criticized for
violating it. Still, the acquaintance norm remains operative, and is exploited by these files in order
to produce their peculiar phenomenological effect: “the thought fails to have a singular content,
though phenomenologically it feels as if it had a singular content” (Recanati 2013, 210). The latter
is the relevant case for theorizing about fiction.
Mental files have been so far exploited in the debate about fiction mainly from an anti-realist
perspective (cf. Crane 2013, Everett 2013, Friend 2014). The idea is that, in engaging with a work
of fiction, one opens irregular mental files about fictional characters as if they were real people,
albeit one knows that fictional characters in fact do not exist. My point is that this is not the whole
story. Although I agree with the anti-realist idea that one opens irregular mental files about fictional
characters as nonexistent individuals,  I argue that one can also open regular mental files about
fictional characters as existing abstract artifacts.
Unlike what happens in the case of ordinary objects, we can use two files, not just one, in our
engagement with fictional characters: a file for a relation to a nonexistent individual, and another
file for a relation to an existing abstract artifact. We, as appreciators of works of fiction, enjoy a
purported relation to a nonexistent individual in virtue of exploiting the actual relation to an abstract
artifact.i From this perspective,  one can conceive of a fictional character as an abstract artifact
whose function is to generate an irregular mental file about a nonexistent individual, and possibly
also a regular mental file about the artifact itself. I will call the former a ‘fiction file’ and the latter a
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‛source file’. In the remainder of this section, I will focus on fiction files. I will discuss source files
in the next section.
A fiction file purports to refer to a fictional character as a particular individual in the fictional
world. It lacks an acquaintance relation to its object, and that is why it is irregular. Still, it differs
from a mere  figment  of  the  imagination  since it  acquires  information through an acquaintance
relation between the subject and a real object – say, for the moment, a work of fiction. In this sense,
a fiction file resembles a regular file. Nevertheless, the regular file acquires information through a
relation to the object it  is about whereas the fiction file gains information through a relation to
another object, which is not the object the fiction file is about. In spite of its being irregular, the
fiction  file  acquires  information  that  is  determined  by public  objective  sources,  not  arbitrarily
established by the thinker. In this sense, fiction files are not only irregular files but also “public or
shared files – files shared by distinct individuals in a community” (Recanati 2012, 205). In our case,
the community is the audience of a certain work of fiction. Each member of the audience opens her
own fiction file, but is committed to store in this file the same core information stored by the other
members of the audience.
2. A further step in the characterization of fiction files consists in treating them as special cases of
those irregular files to which Recanati attributes a “discourse-referential function”. If we hear a
speaker saying “I don’t believe that Mary had a baby and named  her Sue”, we open not only a
regular file about Mary (in addition to an already opened regular file about the speaker), but also an
irregular  file  about  Mary’s  baby.  According  to  Recanati,  the  reason  is  that  “when  we process
discourse,  we  treat  even  non-referential  pronouns  as  if  they  referred  to  objects,  and  store  the
information conveyed about the objects in question (‘the discourse referents’) in files, just as, in
processing referential discourse, we store information conveyed about ordinary referents in files”
(2012, 174).
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A file  that  performs  a  discourse-referential  function  purports  to  refer  within  a  framework
embedded into a discourse-operator. In Recanati’s example, the discourse-operator is made explicit
by the  clause  “I  don’t  believe  that...”,  while  in  the  case  of  fiction  files  the  discourse-operator
normally remains implicit,  though it  can be made explicit by clauses such as “according to the
fiction...” or “in the fictional world...”.
For  a  fiction file  is  an  irregular  file  that  purports  to  refer  to  a  particular  individual  in  the
framework of a discourse,  it  can be underlain by a regular file that refers to the  source  of the
discourse. That is why I call the latter file a ‘source file’. Thus, information concerning fictional
characters is split between two files. On the one hand, the fiction file stores “internal” (or “nuclear”
or “fictional”) information concerning the character as a particular individual, which I call the  f-
character.  On  the  other  hand,  the  source  file  stores  “external”  (or  “extranuclear”  or  “meta-
fictional”) information concerning the character as something created, which I call the s-character.
For example, the fiction file stores the date of birth of the f-character, the name of her parents, her
job, while the source file stores the date of creation of the s-character, the name of her author, her
role in the narrative structure (e.g. protagonist, antagonist, mentor). In sum, an s-character generates
a fiction file, which purports to refer to the corresponding f-character, but we can actually refer to
the s-character itself by means of a source file.
In fact, a fictional character can exist only as an s-character, but since the latter generates a
fiction file, the audience of a work of fiction can experience also the corresponding f-character.
When  the  appreciators  of  a  work  of  fiction  find  a  character  especially  significant,  they  can
supplement  the  generic  source  file  concerning  the  work  of  fiction  with  a  specific  source  file
concerning the fictional character itself. In this case, the external information about the s-character
is unified into a specific source file instead of being grouped with the external information about
other s-characters into the generic source file about the work of fiction. Creating a specific source
file about the s-character, in addition to the fiction file concerning the f-character, suggests that we
can think of a fictional character in two different ways. We can think of it as an individual who
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inhabits the fictional world on the one hand, and as an artifact that contributes to the functioning of
a work of fiction on the other.
Murray Smith (2011) characterizes such a duality as the “twofoldness of a fictional character”,
noting that we can take two distinct attitudes towards fictional characters. On the one hand, “So
readily do we recognize in fictions those ‛virtual persons’ we call characters that we can speak of
them and respond to them in many ways just as if they were actual persons” (2011, 280). On the
other hand, “We exhibit awareness of the configurational aspect of character whenever we note or
notice something bearing upon the designed status of a character, when we see a character as an
element in a representation” (2011, 280).
Developing Smith’s insight in terms of mental files, I call ‘twofileness’ the situation in which an
appreciator of a work of fiction opens two files about a certain fictional character; namely, a fiction
file about an individual in the fictional world, and a source file about an element in a representation.
In this sense, twofileness allows the recipient of a work of fiction to experience a fictional character
as a fictional individual (through the fiction file), while, at the same time, tracing this experience
back to its source (through the source file). This is the main explanatory advantage of the notion of
twofileness, that is, to provide us with a satisfying account of the complex cognitive activity of
fiction appreciation.
In principle, there are three levels at which one can engage with fictional characters. At a basic
level, one can just deploy fiction files together with some background awareness of the fact that
such files do not refer to individuals in the actual world but only purport to refer to individuals in
the fictional world. In this case, no source file is deployed even though the awareness of the nature
of fiction involves acknowledging that there is some source that is responsible for the fictional story
one is enjoying; therefore, in principle, one might refer to this source. That is to say that the source
file is not actually deployed but there is a potential for deploying it. Arguably, this is the level at
which very young children – and, more generally, “naive” or “immersed” recipients – engage with
works of fiction.
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At an intermediate level, one can start focusing on what is responsible for the information one
has  stored  in  the  fiction  files.  This  leads  one  to  deploy  not  only  fiction  files  about  fictional
individuals but also a source file about the work of fiction that provides one with information about
such individuals. In this case, the external information about the s-character is stored in the file
concerning the work of fiction, instead of in a specific source file. This can be considered as a basic
case of twofileness in which a character shares its source file with other characters belonging to the
same work of fiction. Arguably, this is the level at which ordinary appreciators usually engage with
works of fiction.
Finally, at the highest level, one can gather information about the specific design features that
are responsible for the information one gathers about a specific fictional individual. ii This leads one
to deploy not only fiction files about fictional individuals and a source file about the work of fiction,
but also source files about specific fictional characters understood as elements in a representation,
that is, as functional components whose function precisely is the generation of fiction files.
From this perspective, a fictional character is, so to speak, the “source code” that leads one to
generate a fiction file about the corresponding fictional individual, and a source file allows one to
trace one’s experience of a fictional individual back to such a “source code”. iii One can do that, for
instance, by underlining all the sentences of a novel that contribute to one’s mental file about a
certain fictional individual. This sort of exercise can improve our appreciation of that novel by
leading us to pay attention to the “source code” through which the writer made up that fictional
individual.
Arguably, this is the level at which sophisticated (“aesthetically-minded”) appreciators such as
critics  or  scholars  engage  with  works  of  fiction.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  fictional
characters exist as functional components only for such sophisticated appreciators. Rather, the latter
appreciators highlight something that was already there (namely, a “source code”, an element in a
representation),  but  remained  unnoticed  in  ordinary  practices  of  appreciation.  Sophisticated
appreciators highlight the existence of fictional characters (understood as functional components) to
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whom ordinary appreciators do not pay attention, just as the latter highlight the existence of the
work of fiction to whom naive or immersed appreciators do not pay attention.
3. The notion of twofileness allows us to reconsider the debate between artifactualism and anti-
realism about fictional characters from a new perspective. Let us begin with pointing out two basic
premises on which both artifactualists and anti-realists can agree.iv  
First,  a  fiction file  does  not  concern a  real  entity:  we have  the  impression that  a  fictional
individual exists only because we deploy a fiction file about it, i.e. a representation about it. In this
sense, the fictional character is “representation-dependent”, as Tim Crane (2013, 68) puts it.
Second, this representation does not arise from nothing. The appreciators of a work of fiction
share their representations about a certain fictional character in such a way that they can find a
reasonable agreement about the basic features of that character. There is  something objective that
elicits such representations and warrants their convergence.
Still, what is this “something”? What is the source of the representations? Here is where the
disagreement between artifactualism and anti-realism arises. On the one hand, the anti-realist denies
that this source is the fictional character as an abstract artifact, claiming that this source is nothing
but the work of fiction: “the authors create works of fiction: that is enough” (Crane 2013, 80). On
the other hand, the artifactualist can point out that if one looks into the work of fiction, one finds
passages that introduce a certain fictional character and ascribe features to it. It is these passages,
not the work of fiction in general, that allow the appreciators to deploy and share representations
about a certain fictional character, namely fiction files.
I argue that these passages have a distinctive unity that comes from their fulfilling a distinctive
function, that is, eliciting a specific representation from the appreciators. Thus, these passages give
a specific contribution to the functioning of the work of fiction. In this sense, the information one
can gather in a source file about a fictional character is not generic information about the work of
fiction,  but  specific  information  about  that  fictional  character  as  a  specific  outcome of  human
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creativity. A source file of this sort differs from the corresponding fiction file precisely because the
former actually refers to something in the actual world (something more specific than the work of
fiction  as  a  whole,  namely the fictional  character  as  a  ”source  code”),  whereas  the  latter  only
purports to refer to something in the fictional world (namely the fictional individual).
This argument in favor of artifactualism, which I will call “the argument from mental files”, can
be articulated as follows:
Premise (1): if the functioning of an artifact requires the fulfillment of a function that is more
specific than the function of the whole artifact, there must be an element of the artifact that carries
out that specific function, and this element, in turn, is an artifact.
Premise (2): works of fiction are artifacts.
Premise (3): the functioning of a work of fiction requires the fulfillment of a specific function,
namely, the generation of a mental file about a certain fictional individual.
Conclusion  (4):  there  are  artifacts  that  are  elements  of  works  of  fiction  and carry out  the
function of generating mental files about fictional individuals. 
Premise  (1)  is  supported  by  the  ontology  of  artifacts.v For  instance,  the  functioning  of  a
wristwatch requires the fulfillment of the specific function of indicating minutes, and the element of
the wristwatch that carries out that specific function, namely, the minute hand, in turn, is an artifact.
Premise (2) is supported by the ontology of works of art. Premise (3) has been defended above. 
These premises lead to the conclusion (4) in the following way. Because of (1) there must be an
element of the work of fiction that fulfills the specific function considered in (3), and because of (2)
this element in turn, is an artifact, which one can call a fictional character.
This conclusion involves that a fictional character is an artifact in virtue of being a functional
component of a work of fiction; hence the fictional character is an element in a representation;
hence it is representation-dependent. Yet, this dependence does not prevents the fictional character
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from being an artifact. Indeed, the character is an artifact precisely in virtue of this dependence. In
order  to  elucidate  this  point,  let  us  reconsider  Crane’s  claim  that  a  fictional  character  is
“representation-dependent” (2013, 68). In fact, there are three ways in which this predicate can be
read.
First, a fictional character, considered as a fictional individual, is representation-dependent in
the sense that it depends on a mental representation, namely a fiction file, which purports to refer to
it. In this case, the representation involves a purported reference that lacks a referent, and thus being
representation-dependent surely entails nonexistence.
Second,  a  fictional  character,  still  considered  as  a  fictional  individual,  is  representation-
dependent in the sense that it depends on a public representation, namely a work of fiction. Such a
dependence involves a causal connection between the public representation, i.e. the work of fiction
as a cause, and the mental representation, i.e. the fiction file (which purports to refer to the fictional
individual) as an effect.vi
However,  this is not the whole story.  There is a third way in which a fictional character is
representation-dependent, viz. as an element in a representation. The relevant representation, here,
is the work of fiction as a public representation, and the fictional character is no longer considered
as a fictional individual but rather as a functional component of the work of fiction: what in the
work of fiction is responsible for the generation of the fiction file about the corresponding fictional
individual. Thus, the dependence of the character on this representation is a kind of part-whole
relationship. This kind of dependence, unlike those considered above, fits with the existence of the
character. For the work of fiction exists, its components also should exist. From this perspective, the
relationship  between  a  work  of  fiction  and  its  fictional  characters  can  be  compared  to  the
relationship between an organism and its organs, or a machine and its modules. Fictional characters
contribute to the functioning of a work of fiction much as organs contribute to the functioning of an
organism, or modules to the functioning of a machine.
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In sum, a fictional character as an abstract artifact is a component of a work of fiction (i.e. a
public representation) that has the function of generating a fiction file (i.e. a mental representation)
that purports to refer to the corresponding fictional individual. By appreciating the design features
of fictional characters, sophisticated appreciators pay attention not only to the work of fiction as a
whole (i.e., to the representation as a whole) but also to the functioning of its components (i.e., to
the elements in the representation); they can be compared to entomologists who pay attention not
only to an insect as a whole but also to the functioning of its organs.
Just  as  insects’ organs  are  not  created  by  entomologists,  fictional  characters  as  functional
components are not created by sophisticated appreciators, who, instead, exploit their expertise in
order to notice these elements in a work of fiction and to make reference to them. In this sense, one
might treat the argument from mental files as an argument to the best explanation of our practices of
appreciation of works of fiction.vii
4. The argument from mental files is compatible with two different accounts of fictional characters
that I shall call “austere artifactualism” and “robust artifactualism”.
According to austere artifactualism, a fictional character is nothing but a component of a work
of fiction that fulfills a specific function, just as the plumbing of a building or the respiratory system
of an animal. It does not exist in addition to the work of fiction but only as an element of it. It is
simply what, in a work of fiction, is responsible for our purported reference to the corresponding
fictional individual. The appreciator of a work of fiction can keep track of this element by means of
a source file just as she keeps track of the fictional individual by means of a fiction file.
If one remains in the framework of austere artifactualism, then stating that there is a work of
fiction and its fictional characters is just another way of stating that there is nothing but a work of
fiction. That is because the existence of fictional characters as functional components is part of the
existence of the work of fiction, and therefore by stating the latter one is already stating the former.
Thus, adding the conjunct “and its fictional characters” to the claim “there is a work of fiction” is as
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redundant as adding the conjunct “and its respiratory system” to the claim “there is an animal”. That
is to say that austere artifactualism does not involve refutation of Crane’s above mentioned anti-
realist claim: “the authors create works of fiction: that is enough”.
This might lead one to wonder whether austere artifactualism really is a kind of realism or
should rather count as a kind of anti-realism.viii The answer to this question depends on whether one
conceives of realism about fictional characters as a claim of their existence in addition to the work
of fiction or just within the work of fiction. I will not take a stand on this. My point, here, is just that
treating fictional characters as functional components of works of fiction contributes to explaining
our appreciation of those works thereby shedding some light on the nature of these characters. To
settle the question of whether fictional characters, as functional components of works of fiction,
deserve to be called ‘real’ in a metaphysically robust sense goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Thus, I acknowledge that the view I am advocating might not be a fully-fledged realist account
of  fictional  characters.  It  might  be  only  a  kind  of  functionalism according  to  which  fictional
characters are just functional components that contribute to the whole functioning of a work of
fiction. However, even if this was the case, my conception of fictional characters as generators of
mental files would remain slightly different from a sheer anti-realist conception according to which
it  makes  no  sense  to  conceive  of  fictional  characters  except  as  nonexistent  individuals  in  the
fictional world. In this sense, austere artifactualism – or functionalism, if one prefers – can be seen
as the minimal step one can take to distance oneself from anti-realism. This is also the minimal
sense in which one can treat a fictional character as an abstract artifact, that is, as a component
fulfilling a specific function thereby contributing to the functioning of an encompassing abstract
artifact.
If one wants to shift from such an austere functionalist view to an unquestionably realist view,
one should endorse robust artifactualism, which conceives of a fictional character not just as the set
of features of a work of fiction that provides us with information about the corresponding fictional
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individual, but rather as a self-standing entity, which can correspond to such features but does not
boil down to them.
A straightforward  way to  move  from an  austere  artifactualism to  a  robust  one  consists  in
endorsing Voltolini’s (2006, 223–246) argument. This states that the existence of a work of fiction
entails the existence of its fictional characters because the identity conditions of the former need to
make reference to the latter. From Voltolini’s perspective, fictional characters are more than just
elements of works of fiction; they are things to whom works of fiction must make reference in order
to exist.ix
Furthermore,  drawing  on  Thomasson’s  (1999,  130;  2003,  220)  analogy  between  fictional
characters and juridical laws (both understood as abstract artifacts), one can develop a version of
robust artifactualism that conceives of a fictional character as a sort of norm that has been implicitly
established by the maker of a work of fiction. In terms of mental files, one might conceive of this
norm as  prescribing  which  information  a  suitable  recipient  should  gather  in  the  corresponding
fiction file. In this sense, a fictional character is a normative abstract artifact, just as a juridical law
is: they both prescribe what we ought to do. Yet, juridical laws are explicitly embodied in texts or
codes containing articles, whereas fictional characters are implicitly embodied in the text of a work
of fiction.
To  sum  up,  both  austere  artifactualism  and  robust  artifactualism  are  compatible  with  the
conception of a fictional character as the element of a work of fiction that fulfills the function of
generating a fiction file, that is, a mental file about a fictional individual. Yet, according to austere
artifactualism, the fictional character is nothing but the set of design features of the work of fiction
which prescribe what information one should gather in the corresponding fiction file. By contrast,
according to robust artifactualism, such passages correspond to a set of prescriptions, which, in
principle,  might  exist  independently  of  one  particular  work  of  fiction,  as  suggested  by  the
possibility for a fictional characters to appear in several works.
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In order to elucidate the distinction between austere artifactualism and robust artifactualism, let
us  consider  the  way in  which  Nathan  Salmon  articulates  his  artifactualist  account  of  fictional
characters: “Think […] of the various roles that a director might cast in a stage or screen production
of a particular piece of fiction. Now think of the corresponding characters as the components of the
fiction that play or occupy those roles in the fiction. It is no accident that one says of an actor in a
dramatic production that he/she is playing a ‘part.’ The characters of a fiction—the occupants of
roles in the fiction—are in some real sense parts of the fiction itself” (1998, 78-79). 
On the one hand, by treating fictional characters as “the occupants of roles in the fiction” and
thus “in some real sense  parts  of the fiction itself”, Salmon seems to endorse a kind of austere
artifactualism.x On the other hand, a supporter of robust realism would rather state that fictional
characters  are  the  roles  themselves,  which  are  embodied  in  the  parts  of  the  work  of  fiction.
According to robust artifactualism, fictional characters exist as “parts” of the work of fiction in
virtue of existing as “roles” that determine how such parts should be. As a “part” of a work of
fiction, a fictional character allows us to store in our mental file about the corresponding fictional
individual the features that are prescribed by this very character as a “role”. 
Conversely, according to austere artifactualism, the prescriptions lie in the parts of the work of
fiction itself. As Salmon puts it, “It is of the very essence of a fictional character to be depicted in
the fiction as the person who takes part in such-and-such events, performs such-and-such actions,
thinks such-and-such thoughts. Being so depicted is the character’s  raison d’être […] It is of the
very essence of Shakespeare’s Hamlet that there is indeed an object that is Hamlet. I am not urging
that we countenance a person who is Hamlet1 and who contemplated suicide according to the classic
play but who does not exist. There is no sense in which there is any such person. The objective
Hamlet is Hamlet2—what plays the title role in the Bard’s drama—and hence not a human being at
all but a part of fiction, merely depicted there as anguished and suicidal” (1998, 79).
With respect to Salmon’s example, twofileness consists in opening not only an irregular fiction
file  about  the fictional individual Hamlet1 but also a  regular  source file  about Hamlet2,  i.e.  the
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element of the work of fiction that is responsible for our deploying the irregular file about Hamlet 1.
However, the argument from mental files should remain neutral on whether Hamlet2 is nothing but a
part of the work of fiction Hamlet (as stated by austere artifactualism) or a self-standing role that is
embodied in that part of Hamlet (as stated by robust artifactualism). The twofileness phenomenon is
compatible with both these explanations.
5. There is a sense in which the information we store in the fiction file can be also contained in the
source file. For instance, the piece of information that Hamlet is anguished can be stored in both
files. Yet, the way in which this piece of information is stored in the two files is different since the
two files concern different kinds of things. In the fiction file, ‘anguished’ is a feature of a person,
whereas  in  the  source  file  this  is  a  feature  of  an  artifact,  which  generates  our  fiction  file  and
prescribes us to store this feature in it. In other words, in the fiction file ‘anguished’ indicates what a
person is,  whereas  in  the source file  ‘anguished’ indicates  what  an artifact  does;  the person  is
anguished whereas the artifact represents that person as anguished. Borrowing Zalta’s (1983) terms,
the property ‘anguished’ is “exemplified” by a person but only “encoded” by an abstract artifact,
which instead exemplifies properties such as ‘having been created by Shakespeare’.xi
The fact that the same features can be present in both files, albeit in different ways, allows us to
exploit  one  file  as  a  surrogate  for  the  other.  In  particular,  we can  exploit  the  fiction  file  as  a
surrogate for the source file. When we do so, we grasp the features that the fictional character, as an
artifact, actually prescribes by attending to the features that the fictional character, as an individual,
fictionally possesses. In this sense, twofileness can be relevant not only for our engagement with
fiction “from the inside”, but also for our discourse about fiction “from the outside”. 
On the one hand, in our engagement with fiction, we normally focus on the fictional character
as an individual to which the fiction file purports to refer, and the source file becomes relevant only
when we wonder what caused our experience of that fictional individual. On the other hand, in our
discourse about fiction, we rather focus on the fictional character as an abstract artifact to which our
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source file actually refers, and the fiction file becomes relevant only when, in order to figure out
what  the  artifact  prescribes  us  to  do,  we  abide  by  this  prescription  thereby  deploying  the
corresponding fiction file. In this case, we figure out the cause (the artifact) by undergoing its effect
(the fiction file).
This allows us to shed some light on the “mixed perspective” (Everett, 2013, 163) that one
adopts  when one thinks,  for  example,  of Anna Karenina as  a fictional  character  who commits
suicide. In principle, when one thinks of fictional characters without directly engaging with a work
of fiction, one can deploy only a source file containing both historical information (e.g. that Anna
was created by Tolstoy) and design features (e.g that Anna is represented as committing suicide).
However, the most effective way we have to represent design features consists in deploying the
fiction file that satisfies such prescriptions. In this sense, one might say that the source file contains
a pointer to the corresponding fiction file. Therefore, thinking of Anna as a fictional character who
commits suicide amounts to exploiting this pointer, which connects the source file about a fictional
character, which represents a woman as committing suicide, to the fiction file about a woman who
committed suicide. This suggests that twofileness can be relevant not only in our engagement with
fiction but also in our discourse about fiction.
To sum up, thinking of Anna Karenina as a fictional character who commits suicide consists in
putting in  the  source file  concerning this  character  the  information  that  it  represents  a  woman
named Anna as committing suicide, thereby being entitled to put in the corresponding fiction file the
information  that  Anna  committed  suicide.xii This  seems  to  be  a  reasonable  way of  thinking  of
fictional characters from outside of the engagement with a fiction. Yet, this only holds for external
discourse. In fact, when one actually engages with Tolstoy’s novel, it would be awkward to think of
Anna as a ‘fictional character who commits suicide’. Indeed, Anna Karenina mandates the reader to
think of Anna as a woman who commits suicide. That is to say that, within the fictional world, Anna
does  not  have the feature of being represented by Tolstoy as committing suicide.  She commits
suicide, full stop. That is why we need a fiction file distinct from the source file.
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In fact, the emotions that a novel such  Anna Karenina  can elicit from the reader come from
thinking  of  Anna  as  a  flesh-and-blood  individual.  Surely,  these  emotions  can  be  tempered  by
simultaneously deploying the corresponding source file that reminds us that Anna is nothing but an
abstract artifact. Yet, for these emotions to arise, a fiction file concerning Anna as a woman should
be deployed.
6. One may wonder whether the argument from mental files can be extended also to works of non-
fiction. Consider a biography of Napoleon. It may be tempting to say that, in reading it, we open a
“fiction  file”  (or,  better,  a  “history  file”)  in  order  to  store  information  about  Napoleon  as  an
individual and also a “source file” in order to store information about Napoleon as a character in
this book. For example, we store in the source file about Napoleon pieces of information such as
“being the protagonist of this book” or “being introduced at page 3”. Yet, in this case, the argument
from mental  files  would  lead  us  to  the  conclusion  that  historical  figures  are,  in  turn,  abstract
artifacts. If one took this to be clearly absurd, one would conclude that there must be something
wrong in  the  argument  from mental  files,  something that  should  prevent  it  from showing that
fictional characters are abstract artifacts.
However, I argue, there is nothing absurd in treating historical characters as components of
works of history. In fact, these works function just as works of fiction do, that is, by generating
mental  files  about  individuals.  Just  as  we  conceive  of  fictional  characters  as  the  functional
components of works of fiction that generate mental files about fictional individuals, we might
conceive of historical characters as the functional components of works of history that generate
mental files about historical individuals. Thus, in appreciating a work of history, we can focus on
the way in which historical characters function as elements in a representation as well as we can
focus on fictional characters as functional components of a work of fiction. 
Still, there is a crucial difference between fiction and history (and, more generally, non-fiction)
in this respect. On the one hand, the function of a historical character, as an element of a work of
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history, consists in generating a regular file about an individual who belongs to the same world to
which the work of history belongs. On the other hand, the function of a fictional character, as an
element of a work of fiction, consists in generating an irregular file about a fictional individual who
belongs to a fictional world that is different from that to which the work of fiction belongs.
As a consequence of this, the deployment of mental files in our engagement with works of
history is different from that in our engagement with works of fiction. For instance, in reading a
biography of Napoleon, pieces of information such as “being the protagonist of this book” or “being
introduced at page 3” can be stored directly in the file that we deploy about Napoleon as a historical
individual.  This  is  because  the  biography we are  reading belongs  to  the  same world  to  which
Napoleon belongs, namely the actual world, and, within this world, there is a causal connection that
relates Napoleon to his biography, thereby allowing us to treat some features of that biography as
features of Napoleon himself. Thus, storing such pieces of information as “being the protagonist of
this book” or “being introduced at page 3” in the mental file about Napoleon as an individual is a
correct way of reading a biography of Napoleon.
By contrast, if we consider a novel about Pinocchio, “being the protagonist of this book” or
“being introduced at page 3” are not features that a suitable reader should ascribe to Pinocchio as an
individual. These are just features of Pinocchio as an abstract artifact, not features of Pinocchio as
the inhabitant of a fictional world. The reason is that the novel we are reading is not part of the
fictional world to which Pinocchio as an individual belongs, and therefore the pieces of information
about the novel cannot be ascribed also to a fictional individual.
In this  sense,  the distinction between fiction files and source files allows us to highlight a
distinction  between  works  of  fiction  and  works  of  non-fiction.  For  what  concerns  pieces  of
information such as “being the protagonist of this book” or “being introduced at page 3”, a work of
non-fiction allows us to store them in the same mental file in which we store information about the
protagonist of the work as an individual. By contrast, a work of fiction mandates us to store such
pieces of information in a distinct mental file. That is because a work of fiction and its fictional
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individuals belong to distinct worlds (viz. the actual world and the fictional world, respectively),
and therefore the pieces of information that concern the work of fiction cannot concern also its
fictional individuals. Otherwise, in order to warrant the appropriate flow of information, we should
treat the fictional world as causally connected to our actual world, in direct contrast  with what
works of fiction typically mandate us to do.
7.  So far I  have considered mental files deployed by the users of works of fiction,  and I  have
characterized fictional characters as artifacts whose function consists in the generation of mental
files. More specifically, the fictional character as an abstract artifact generates a fiction file in the
appreciator’s mind that purports to refer to the corresponding fictional individual. Furthermore, the
appreciator can also open a source file that actually refers to the fictional character as an abstract
artifact.
At this point, one might wonder how an abstract object such as a work of fiction, or a fictional
character,  can  originate  a  causal  chain  that  ends  up  in  the  generation  of  mental  files  in  an
appreciator’s mind. On the one hand, I acknowledge that the proximal cause of the generation of
mental files in the appreciator’s mind is a token of the work of fiction, e.g. a paper copy of a novel
or a screening of a movie. On the other hand, I argue that this token is only the penultimate link of a
causal chain that originates in the creation of the work of fiction – and of fictional characters as its
components – and ends up in the generation of mental files in the appreciator’s mind. From this
perspective, authors create abstract objects that, within the relevant cultural practice, establish the
way in which the corresponding tokens are to be produced and used.xiii Thus, we can deploy mental
files about such abstract objects by exploiting a direct causal relation to their tokens. 
This is what usually happens when we appreciate novels or movies. We exploit a paper copy or
a screening in order to acquire the relevant information, but the mental files in which we gather
information about these works usually are about novels as abstract objects or movies as abstract
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objects, not about their concrete tokens. That is why appreciators can refer to the  same  work of
fiction in discussion even though they have been in touch with different tokens of this work. 
That being the case, if we treat fictional characters as components of works of fiction such as
novels and movies, we can conclude that an appreciator is causally connected to fictional characters
as abstract objects in the same way in which she is causally connected to works of fiction as abstract
objects.xiv Concrete tokens of a work of fiction are links of a causal chain that originates in the
creation of the work of fiction itself as an abstract artifact, as well as of the fictional characters that
are its components, and ends up in the generation of mental files in the appreciator’s mind.
Certainly,  an author  does  not  have  to  possess  the  notion of  a  mental  file,  yet  mental  files
provide us with an effective model of the process through which a character is created. For instance,
Honoré  de  Balzac  designed Lucien  de  Rubempré  in  such a  way that  a  suitable  reader  of  Les
illusions perdues should store in a fiction file internal information like that f-Lucien is a writer, and
can store in the corresponding source file external information like that s-Lucien is the hero of the
novel and one of the main characters of the narrative cycle called “La Comédie humaine”.
The main task of the creator of a fictional character consists in providing the audience with the
internal information to be stored in the fiction file. The external information to be stored in the
source file often remains implicit, as a side effect of the creation of the work of fiction within a
certain cultural practice. However, an appreciator can take such information into account in order to
properly appreciate the design of a certain character.  The role of the source file becomes more
explicit when authors do not create fictional characters from scratch but build up new versions of
already existing characters. In this case a suitable appreciator of this work of fiction should store
this information concerning the character’s history of making in the source file about that character.
In the  process  of  creation  of  fictional  characters,  authors  can  –  and arguably do –  deploy
irregular mental files about fictional individuals. Yet, such “pre-fiction” files are not to be confused
with the fiction files that will be generated in the appreciator’s mind. Although both pre-fiction files
and  fiction  files  are  irregular  files,  the  former  are  mere  figments  of  the  author’s  imagination
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whereas the latter are generated (and constrained) by public sources, that is, abstract objects that are
causally active through concrete tokens such as paper copies of novels or screenings of movies.
That is to say that pre-fiction files and the fiction files have a different role in the life cycle of a
work of  fiction;  the  former  can  contribute  to  its  creation  whereas  the  latter  are  a  result  of  its
functioning. In sum, an author creates fictional characters through a process that may involve the
deployment of pre-fiction files, but the outcome of this process are fictional characters as abstract
artifacts,  which  should  be  capable  of  generating  fiction  files,  as  well  as  source  files,  in  the
appreciator’s mind.
For  I  conceive  of  a  fictional  character  as  an  artifact  whose  primary  function  consists  in
generating fiction files thereby contributing to the functioning of a work of fiction, I state that the
creation of a fictional character is completed when the creation of the corresponding work of fiction
is completed.  This is my way of addressing the “when-problem” that Stuart  Brock (2010, 355)
formulates in the following terms: “One problem for the abstract creationist,  then, is specifying
when fictional characters are brought into existence by their author. When, exactly, does life begin
for a fictional character?”. My functionalist approach involves that fictional characters start existing
when they can properly contribute to the work of fiction of which they are functional components,
that is,  when  the work of fiction in which they appear starts existing. Until a work of fiction is
nothing but a work in progress, its fictional characters are in turn nothing but “artifacts in progress”.
The life of a fictional character begins when the corresponding work of fiction begins existing, just
as, for example, the black king in chess begun existing when the game of chess did so.
8. Ultimately, a fictional character is an abstract artifact, which is created by an author (or a team
thereof) by creating a work of fiction and whose function is to generate a fiction file in the mind of
a suitable appreciator of that work of fiction, and possibly a source file that allows one to also
appreciate  the  design  features  of  that  character.  Although  all fictional  characters,  as  abstract
artifacts, have the function of generating a fiction file and possibly a source file, the nature of the
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information  stored  in  these  files  depends  on  the  medium through which  a  certain  character  is
created. For example, in literary fiction the information stored in the fiction file basically consists of
linguistic predicates, whereas in staged fiction (e.g. theater, cinema, TV series) the fiction file can
store information in a sensory format. Furthermore, in the case of staged fiction, the source file
stores  not  only information  directly  supplied  by the  creator  of  the  fictional  character  but  also
information about the staging, for example information about the actor who plays the character.
We,  as  readers  of  novels  or  spectators  of  movies,  carry  out  tasks  of  identification  and
recognition  of  particular  individuals  that  emulate  the  corresponding  tasks  which  our  ordinary
experience relies on. For example, the task carried out by the spectator of a movie emulates her
ordinary task of perceptual  identification and recognition of particular individuals,  and the task
carried out by the reader of a novel emulates her ordinary task of identification and recognition of
particular individuals referred to in oral or written communication. In our engagement with works
of fiction, we can effectively carry out such tasks because fiction files have a phenomenology of
reference that is similar to that of regular files.
The key difference is twofileness, that is, the fact that we can supplement the fiction file with a
source file that discloses the true nature of the fictional individual to whom that file purports to
refer.  On  the  one  hand,  by  deploying  a  regular  file  in  our  ordinary  experience,  we  have  the
impression that we are referring to a particular individual and we are in fact referring to her. On the
other hand, by deploying a fiction file in our experience of works of fiction, we have the impression
that we are referring to a particular individual, when in fact the thing to which we are actually
related to is an abstract artifact, and we can pay attention to this by deploying a source file that
actually refers to this artifact. While the fiction file allows us to enjoy a fictional character as if it
was a real person, the source file reminds us of what it really is.xv
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This does not entail that, in engaging with fiction, one pretends, of an abstract artifact, that this is a flesh-
and-blood individual. The account I am advocating is not committed to this claim and therefore can remain
neutral on this issue (a thorough discussion of which can be found in Thomasson 2003, 210–214).
ii
I borrow the notion of ‘design features’ from Dominic Lopes’ account of depiction. According to Lopes
(2005, 25), design features are those features of the surface of a picture that allow a suitable viewer to enjoy a
visual experience of a certain object depicted.   Likewise,  in my conception of  fictional characters,  design
features  are those features of a work of fiction that allow a suitable appreciator to deploy a mental file that
purports  to  refer  to  a  certain fictional  individual.  In  the wake of  Kroes’s  account  of  technical  artifacts,  I
conceive of the design of an artifact as the way in which “a function is ‘translated’ into a structure” (2012, 10).
In the case of fictional characters,  the function consists in the generation of mental files while the structure is
constituted by design features. 
iii
In the case of video games, where a fictional character is encoded in a module of a computer program,
the source-code metaphor can be taken literally. 
iv
What I am considering, here, is a version of anti-realism like Crane’s, according to which only works of
fiction exist, not fictional characters. I am not considering more radical anti-realist views according to which
works of fictions do not exist either.
v
 Consider the ontological principle according to which “Technical kinds are functional kinds; being an
instance of a technical kind is determined by having the appropriate proper function” (Kroes 2012, 98). My
point is  that  the “appropriate proper function”  that  consists in  generating a  mental file  about  a  fictional
individual within the encompassing functioning of a work of fiction individuates the fictional character as a
“technical kind”.  Consider also that a fictional character,  just  as a technical  artifact,  can malfunction. This
happens,  for  instance,  when  it  leads  one  to  store  inconsistent  information  in  the  mental  file  about  the
corresponding fictional individual. 
vi
I am assuming here that public representations such as works of fiction can have causal efficacy. I will
defend this claim in § 7. 
vii
Thanks  to  an  anonymous  reviewer  for  pointing  out  the  possibility  to  interpret  my  argument  as  an
argument to the best explanation.  
viii
Thanks to both the anonymous reviewers for leading me to address this issue.  
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Another  way  of  expressing  the  difference  between  austere  and  robust  artifactualism  consists  in
considering the dependence relationship between the fictional characters as parts and the work of fiction as a
whole. According to austere artifactualism, the parts depend on the whole: if the whole had not existed, the
parts would not have existed since their existence consist in contributing to the functioning of the whole.
According to robust artifactualism, it is the other way around: if the parts had not existed, the whole would
not have existed since its identity conditions require making reference to such parts. From this perspective,
one might treat austere artifactualism as a sort of instrumentalism that cast fictional characters as effective
explanatory  posits  or  “illata”  (along  the  lines  of  Dennett  1987),  or  also  as  parts  that  are  conceptually
distinguishable even though they are not actually separable (along the lines of Brentano 1982/1995, 16; see
also Giustina 2017, 28–30; and Kriegel 2018, 174–178). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for leading me to
consider this way of contrasting austere and robust artifactualism.
x
So does Scott Soames (2002, 93):  “Among the things that exist are stories,  legends, novels,  chapters,
plays, movies, and the like. These are abstract objects created by authors. Fictional characters are constituents
of these objects.  Like the fictions of which they are a part,  fictional characters are a special kind of real,
existing object”. 
xi
Van Inwagen (1977,  305) makes a  similar  distinction between proprieties that  are exemplified by a
fictional character and features that are only “ascribed” to it.
xii
With respect to Zalta’s  distinction introduced above in this section,  I  state that Anna as an abstract
artifact  exemplifies the  feature  “representing  as  committing  suicide”  whereas  it  only  encodes  the  feature
“committing suicide”.  This enables one to store in the source file  about Anna the information that it  is a
fictional character that in the story commits suicide (cf. Thomasson 1999, 105). I am grateful to an anonymous
reviewer for leading me to articulate this point.
xiii
An author can create a work of fiction as an abstract object by producing what Strawson (1959, 232)
calls “a model particular”, as for example the manuscript of a novel: “a kind of prototype, or ideal example,
itself  particular,  which  serves  as  a rule  or  standard for  the production of  others”.  However,  the  ultimate
outcome of the author’s creation is the work of fiction as an abstract object, not as a model particular, as
shown by the case in which the model particular is lost or destroyed and yet the work of fiction keeps existing.
xiv
A thorough account of the causal power of abstract objects with which I am rather sympathetic (except
for its  Platonism),  is  provided by Julian Dodd (2007).  Consider for  instance this  passage:  “it  only  seems
obvious that abstract (i.e. non-spatial) entities cannot be causally efficacious, once a couple of controversial
philosophical assumptions have been made. When these assumptions are (rightly) questioned, the idea that
certain abstracta may yet be causally active […] turns out to be harmless […] Now, the assumptions made by
someone who denies that abstract entities such as types can be causally efficacious would seem to be these:
first, that there are clear criteria for whether an entity participates causally in an event; and, second, that it is
clear that entities without a spatial location fail  to meet these criteria.  But in fact,  neither assumption is
warranted” (Dodd 2007, 13). For what concerns the possibility to actually refer to abstract objects through
chains of  communication,  see  the chapter “Reference to  fictional  characters”  in  Thomasson’s  Fiction and
Metaphysics (1999, 43-54). Consider, for instance, this passage: “Indeed the basic model that Kripke offers in
Naming and Necessity  and Gareth Evans modifies in  The Varieties of Reference  of the determination of the
reference of names through a “baptism” and the continuation and proliferation of the use of a name via chains
of communication can be applied in a modified version to names of fictional entities — provided we allow
that  not  only  causal  relations  but  also  relations  of  ontological  dependence  can  form  a  path  for  direct
reference” (Thomasson 1999, 44). Thanks to a reviewer for leading me to focus on how fictional characters
can originate causal chains that end up in the generation of mental files in the minds of appreciators.
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